Counter Zionist Plans
How to Counter Zionist Plans to divide Middle East:
The “Bernard Lewis Plan” and an other Zionist Plan for the establishment of greater Israel by dividing Middle East known as “Oded Yinon Plan” are being implemented. The situation in Libya, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and now Yemen is enough to clarify and doubts. Formation of “Greater Israel” constitutes the cornerstone of powerful Zionist political parties, as well as within the Israeli military and intelligence establishment. According to the founding father of Zionism Theodore Herzl, “the area of the Jewish State stretches: “From the Brook of Egypt to the Euphrates.” According to Rabbi Fischmann, “The Promised Land extends from the River of Egypt up to the Euphrates, it includes parts of Syria and Lebanon.”
When viewed in the current context, the war on Iraq, the 2006 war on Lebanon, the 2011 war on Libya, the ongoing war on Syria, not to mention the process of regime change in Egypt, and developments in Yemen, Bahrain, annexation of Arab areas in West Bank, oppression and isolation of Gaza must be understood in relation to the Zionist Plan for the Middle East. The latter consists in weakening and eventually fracturing neighboring Arab states as part of an Israeli expansionist project.
“Greater Israel” consists in an area extending from the Nile Valley to the Euphrates.
The Zionist project supports the Jewish settlement movement. More broadly it involves a policy of excluding Palestinians from Palestine leading to the eventual annexation of both the West Bank and Gaza to the State of Israel.
Greater Israel would create a number of proxy States. It would include parts of Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, the Sinai, as well as parts of Iraq and Saudi Arabia.
According to Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya in a 2011 Global Research article, The Yinon Plan was a continuation of Britain’s colonial design in the Middle East:
“[The Yinon plan] is an Israeli strategic plan to ensure Israeli regional superiority. It insists and stipulates that Israel must reconfigure its geo-political environment through the balkanization of the surrounding Arab states into smaller and weaker states.
Israeli strategists viewed Iraq as their biggest strategic challenge from an Arab state. This is why Iraq was outlined as the centerpiece to the balkanization of the Middle East and the Arab World. In Iraq, on the basis of the concepts of the Yinon Plan, Israeli strategists have called for the division of Iraq into a Kurdish state and two Arab states, one for Shiite Muslims and the other for Sunni Muslims. The first step towards establishing this was a war between Iraq and Iran, which the Yinon Plan discusses.
The Atlantic, in 2008, and the U.S. military’s Armed Forces Journal, in 2006, both published widely circulated maps that closely followed the outline of the “Yinon Plan”.
Aside from a divided Iraq, which the Biden Plan also calls for, the Yinon Plan calls for a divided Lebanon, Egypt, and Syria. The partitioning of Iran, Turkey, Somalia, and Pakistan also all fall into line with these views. The Yinon Plan also calls for dissolution in North Africa and forecasts it as starting from Egypt and then spilling over into Sudan, Libya, and the rest of the region.
Greater Israel” requires the breaking up of the existing Arab states into small states.
How to Counter to Zionist Plans:
The best counter to thwart any Zionist plan for the division of Middle East in to small fragmented states is to maintain unity among Arabs at any cost, rest will follow. This is important because all Zionist plans (Oded or Lewis Bernard’s) hinges on the dis unity of Arabs. Since the issue is not regional, due to international ramifications, the unity of Arabs should be integrated with the unity of Muslims, which will also facilitate the support of other countries on the basis of humanity, justice and peace. This shall put sufficient pressure at international level on USA and West, the real benefactors of Zionist Israel to refrain from undertaking such a venture.
Arab & Muslim Unity:
It’s not the political or geographic unity as advocated and perused by some nationalists or religious fanatics but developing broad consensus on major issues for peace and stability being the foremost. The Arab & Muslim unit may be defined as; “States coming together for an agree upon cause, each giving of their resource and support for the common cause, all staying united to realize cause’s fruitation and maintaining relations after the cause has ceased.”
It can be initiated simultaneously; firstly the Arabs unity, due to common language, religion, culture, history and geographical proximity & linkage, secondly among other geographically closer predominantly Muslim countries. There could be many clusters, which may form a broader alliance for cooperation in various fields. The OIC has failed to deliver, being just a forum for discussion only. Arabs, especially Saudi Arabia can play an important role being the custodian of most holy Islamic sites, Harmain Shrefain but has to rise above the sectarianism.
Ironically just thousand years ago, the great cities of Baghdad, Damascus and Cairo took turns to race ahead of the Western world. Islam and innovation were twins. The various Arab caliphates were dynamic superpowers—beacons of learning, tolerance and trade. Yet today the Arabs are in a wretched state. Even as Asia, Latin America and Africa advance, the Middle East is held back by despotism and convulsed by war. The rulers, thinkers and intellectuals among Arab and Muslim world have failed to present counter plan to thwart the mischievous expansionist designs of Zionist.
History can guide as to what can countries of the Middle East learn from past crises to help them in the future? What causes Arab states to unite or disunite, and has “Arab unity” ever existed? If a collective will is necessary to solve the problems of the future, what does the past foretell: a grim or hopeful picture? Ashley Heacock in her thesis "Arab Unity Revisited, Nationalism versus Common Cause”, has tried to address these questions.
In order to answer these questions, one has to understand how relationships between Arab states came to be and what forces impacted their actions and beliefs. There is no guideline for what makes up the entire Arab nation, and it has varied across time. From Morocco all along Mediterranean to Lebanon, Syria to Yemen there are 22 counties known as Arabs at present. However: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, and Syria made up the core Arab countries in the past century, therefore, by focusing to these six primary countries the analysis should be greatly helpful.
The concept of holding an Arab identity came about in the mid-late 1800s, when prevailing loyalties were to the Ottoman Empire, Islam, or local tribes. An Arabic literary revival centered around Lebanon, along with a growing demand by Muslim elites for greater autonomy in Arabic speaking provinces (because spoils of the Ottoman Empire were not reaching them) helped establish a never before known notion of Arab nationalism. Christians in Lebanon were highly influenced by European trends and worked to establish Arabic as a language that could be used extensively for learning, plays, novels, and media like it never had been used before. Furthermore, the Muslim elites asserted that only Arabs could bring back the glorious days of past empires due to their keen understanding of the language of God and organized their supporters in Damascus. This initial awakening did not produce revolutionary effects, but it did plant an awareness among the public of their shared language. It also questioned the legitimacy of Ottoman rule.
The Future of Arab Unity
An analysis of the causes of Arab disunity and unity throughout the history of the modern Middle East by looking at three separate events of international character, Arab-Israel wars of 1948, 1973 & 1991 Gulf war, one may reach reasonable conclusions that may be helpful for future discussions on the topic.
Apart from political reasons the superior military power also played its role in the defeat of Arabs. The Israeli army being well motivated, – again in contrast to Arabs – was well trained and well led. Many of its soldiers had fought in the Jewish resistance movements, such as Haganah, Lehi, and the Stern Gang. Others had fought against the Nazis. Although this wasn’t so relevant by 1967, the fact that all Israelis, men and women, had to do intensive military service, provided a large number of soldiers for the army. Equally, they benefited from talented leaders, such as Ariel Sharon and Moshe Dayan. Again, by contrast, there were no outstanding Arab military leaders. Their training was well illustrated by the speed of their advance across Sinai in both 1956 and 1967. Likewise, in 1967, the Israeli air force managed to wipe out the air forces of Egypt, Jordan and Syria in less than two days! These tactics very much gave Israel an advantage: she used surprise, for example in the 1967 war, and successfully employed the tactic of defending against one country while fighting another, before moving on to the offensive. In contrast, the Arab armies made their intentions clear, as in 1967, giving time for the Israelis to prepare.
This Israeli success was also the result of good equipment, and in this Israel benefited from its links with the USA. In 1948-49, the first ceasefire gave the Israelis time to rearm with modern American weapons. Thereafter, all of their weaponry was up-to-date. Although the Arab countries did receive weapons from the USSR, these were rarely as modern as the Americans, and the Arabs were rarely well trained in their use.
In brief, there were a variety of reasons why Israel defeated Arabs in the wars of 1948-67. These were a mixture of their strengths and Arab weaknesses. Perhaps the most significant reason was the motivation – helped by equipment and training – of the Israeli forces. This was only assisted by the weakness of their enemies in similar areas.
Presently rich Arab Kingdoms and Sheikhdoms are spending billions of dollars in purchase of latest military hardware but lack in training and in strategic & tactical employment.
The 1948 Arab-Israeli War:
This war demonstrated that contradictory causes lay the foundation for disunity right from the start. If states do not have a common cause to gather around, resources will not be spent, states will not support other states in achieving their specific goals, and relations after a cause will most likely be sour. Factors that were most prominently at play in 1948, were quests for power, state security, and pacification of the domestic population. Consideration for the Arab nation and what may be most beneficial to all was hardly on the minds of Arab leaders. Nationalism, rather, dictated state decision
The 1973 Arab-Israeli War and Oil Embargo:
This war told a different story. Although states had separate and distinct causes they were striving towards, none of the goals directly undermined another state’s ambitions, and each state’s objectives could be achieved by joining with other Arab states and starting along the same path. Therefore, Arab unity did exist before and towards the beginning of the war. Nevertheless, because state goals varied, the solution to, achievement, or abandonment of each separate objective was necessarily unique to each country. In effect, after Arab unity had been exploited to get a state to a certain point, it was abandoned, and the causes of all the other Arab states were irrelevant to the nation’s prevailing interests. Factors influencing states in 1973 were primarily pursuit of occupied land and domestic appeasement— both nationalistic causes. The exception was Saudi Arabia. King Faisal was highly swayed by feelings of responsibility to the Arab and Islamic nation that requested his assistance in limiting Israel’s advancements on Muslim lands. Saudi Arabia did not have any territory or economic incentives to gain, yet decidedly took a leadership role and acted on the part of the entire Arab nation—even if it was limited in scope.
The 1991 Gulf War:
The 1991 Gulf War exhibited Arab disunity from the beginning of the conflict to the end due to divergent interests and dissimilar causes. Alliances were primarily based on economic or state security rationales (both nationalistic tendencies) and did not consider what was best for the Arab nation as a whole. Moreover, Arab unity was deemphasized by leaders and popular opinion had little sway. Instead, placating a state’s donor or guardian was the most important interest for states.
Future Prospects of Unity:
Given the history and reality of Arab unity in the past, what can be learned and what does the future hold? The most salient observation comes from the first clause of the definition of Arab unity: “Arab states coming together for an agreed upon cause.” If, in the future, states have causes that conflict with each other, grounds for disunity are automatically present. If states have causes that are different but do not clash, unity may be present, however only up until a certain stage. Consequently, what is essential for Arab unity to persist is for the cause to be the same for each state and for it to be something that all states are motivated to achieve.
The assumption in this analysis is that Arab states act out of national interests, not pan Arab interests, so goodwill and charitable actions are not realistic. This was consistently evidenced in the three cases analyzed, except for the lone example of Saudi Arabia in 1973.
Therefore, the only way Arab states will unite in the future is if there is a common cause that all states feel like they would benefit from. The cause would have to be something that they all agree was in their best interest to pursue, and that they would not lose more than they gained.
Looking at current issues in the Middle East, the conflict in Palestine remains divisive among Arab states and hope for unity is quite dim.
Water issues at present are being handled diplomatically to some extent, but if shortages become disastrous for certain states, disunity and clashes may ensue.
Regarding terrorism, many states have been pointing fingers at other states, blaming them for problems, instead of joining together to combat the violent criminals.
An economic confederacy like the European Union has been suggested and would likely solve a lot of the economic problems many Arab states face. However, convincing the absurdly wealthy Gulf States to join in such an entity with their absurdly poor neighbors to the west would likely prove difficult.
Although the future of Arab unity does look gloomy, each of these pressing issues does have the potential to be a unifying force, although states will first have to see the benefit of uniting for a common cause before they give up their nationalistic tendencies.
There also is a possibility that the rich Gulf States may decide to play more of a big brother role in the Middle East and help poorer states get off their feet. Most of their oil wealth presently is being invested in the West, namely the US, but if that money were to be invested in projects in the Middle East, there could be a major turnaround and chance for greater cooperation.
In conclusion, the Arab world is not a monolithic entity by any means, and past notions of Arab unity between state actors are mere fallacies. The Arab people did often times think of themselves as belonging to a larger community and pressed their governments to follow common cause policies. However, nationalism ultimately prevailed on the state level and it continues to be valued over Arab unity to this day. Consequently, until states find a similar goal that they can all gather around, or until philanthropy becomes the norm, disunity will predominate in the Arab world for years to come. [Same formula may be applicable to the unity of Muslim world]
Muslims cannot get away by putting all the blame upon Zionist conspiracies, they should do soul searching to identify weaknesses and make efforts to address the real issues, for stability and progress. In terms of reasons that applied to all of the conflicts & wars, perhaps the Israelis’ greatest strength was their sense of unity and of purpose which they still maintain. They believed that they were fighting to save their existence, a belief that was increased by the language of Nasser before the 1967 war, when he talked of ‘exterminating’ Israel. As a result, they were determined, well motivated and ruthless. By contrast, the Arab armies often had different aims and poor cooperation: in the 1948-49 war, the Arab leader – King Abdullah of Jordan – was only interested in the West Bank, as it concerned his country. Similarly, the Arab soldiers were quick to give up when the fighting worsened. In the covert war as being fought now by the Zionists through their proxies in the form of terror groups like ISIS (Daesh) exploiting sectarian divide among Shia and Sunnis which need to be addressed by Arabs involving Iran.
Presently the regimes in the Arab and Muslim states appear to be providing assistance and facilitation to implement Zionist plans rather than countering it, which is apparent form the disunity among them on petty issues.
The foremost is the unity of Arabs. The emergency Arab summit hosted by Qatar in March of 2009 after the Israeli siege on Gaza—which killed approximately 1,300 Palestinians, including more than 500 women and children:
(1) Displayed Arab disunity, disagreement, and disillusionment at their best. New alliances formed, with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) on one side and Qatar, Syria, and Hamas on the other.
(2) Rather than joining together for a common cause that seemed so straightforward and non divisive, the Arab states underscored their fluctuating rivalries and longstanding disagreements.
Meanwhile, the region faces numerous challenges: Palestinians remain hostage to a repressive occupation, the state of Iraq sits somewhere between a police state and civil war, fragmented by ISIS (Daesh), water shortages face many countries of the Middle East, a military—and possibly nuclear— standoff exists between Israel and Iran, economic hardship pervades much of the region while populations grow at alarming rates, and Islamic extremism threatens the entire region as well as the whole world. These foreboding factors have the ability to cause immense strife and conflict in the region if not confronted using all the resources and ingenuity of the collective Arab states. Moreover, if Arab states use these complex issues to place blame and acquire power rather than assist weaker neighbors and develop the region, hardship and violence may well prevail.
The opposition and removing the democratically elected government in Egypt by resorting to old military dictatorship is source of concern. Iran meddling in the affairs of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and now Yemen is hindrance to the war against ISIS [Daesh], Al-Qaida and other terrorist groups. This can only benefit Zionists to implement their plan of fragmentation of Middle East.
Following is suggested in broader terms to counter Zionist expansionist design:
1. Introducing true democratic reforms gradually to establish governments according to the will of people, greater participation of people in the affairs of state.
2. People should raise the issue using peaceful means of protests and through media, not armed resistance against established rule even if it is dictatorship or kingdom. Any destabilization or effort to regime change by force will result in anarchy and bloodshed.
3. Establishment of justice and fair play, good governance, reduce corruption for stability.
4. Arab countries should build strong well trained, well motivated professional military forces. National defense cannot be out sourced. Mere purchase of modern military hardware cannot defeat the aggressors. It’s the man behind the weapon which matters.
5. Activate UNO, Arab League and OIC to defeat the non state terrorist groups like ISIS (Daesh), Al Qaida, Taliban, Boko Haram (Nigeria) etc, with support of world powers and Muslim states. The bigger Muslim states like Indonesia, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Bangla Desh should take initiative.
6. Muslim Peace Force may be established on the lines of NATO, financed by rich countries while others can provide manpower.
7. Arrange immediate cease fire among all the other fighting factions, followed by negotiations to address the grievances and settle the disputes.
8. Efforts be made to restore Iraq and Syria with in established boundaries.
9. If establishment of smaller states in Iraq and Syria is inevitable, then possibility of establishing 2 or 3 Arab states with readjusted boundaries by uniting smaller sub states be explored. Concept of confederation of smaller states could also be considered as an option.
10.Instead of making tall buildings and towers, heavy investment be made in education.
11.The religious education be controlled by state, teaching sectarianism, hatred and extremism be curbed while tolerance, patience, peaceful coexistence, human and moral values, the hall mark of Islam be emphasized.
12.Establishment of study groups, intellectual forums and think tanks to constantly review, analyze and recommend measures for stability, peace and progress.
13.Active participation in the global affairs for peace by contribution in the field of science, medicine and technology.
Arab & Muslims Unity: http://freebookpark.blogspot.com/2015/04/arab-unity.html
Arab & Muslims Unity: http://freebookpark.blogspot.com/2015/04/arab-unity.html
From Oded Yinon’s “A Strategy for Israel in the Nineteen Eighties” Published by the Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc. Belmont, Massachusetts, 1982. http://www.globalresearch.ca
Bernard Lewis Plan to Carve up Middle East and Muslim World: http://aftabkhan-net.page.tl/Bernard-Lewis-and-Oded-Yinon-Plans-for-Middle-East-Division.htm
Why was Israel able to defeat its enemies in the wars of 1948-49, 1956, and 1967? http://beta.tutor2u.net/history/blog/why-was-israel-able-to-defeat-its-enemies-in-the-wars-of-1948-49-1956-and-1
Arabs & Muslims Unity: http://freebookpark.blogspot.com/2015/04/arab-unity.html